Pivotal Persuasion
Publication in refereed journal

香港中文大學研究人員
替代計量分析
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其它資訊
摘要A sender seeks to persuade a group of heterogeneous voters to adopt an action. We analyze the sender's information-design problem when the collective decision is made through a majority vote and voting for the action is personally costly. We show that the sender can exploit the heterogeneity in voting costs by privately communicating with the voters. Under the optimal information structure, voters with lower costs are more likely to vote for the sender's preferred action when it is the wrong choice than those with higher costs. The sender's preferred action is therefore adopted with a higher probability when private communication is allowed than when it is not. Nevertheless, the sender's preferred action cannot be adopted with probability one if no voter, as a dictator, is willing to vote for it without being persuaded.
出版社接受日期27.12.2018
著者Jimmy Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li, Yun Wang
期刊名稱Journal of Economic Theory
出版年份2019
月份3
卷號180
出版社Elsevier
頁次178 - 202
國際標準期刊號0022-0531
電子國際標準期刊號1095-7235
語言美式英語
關鍵詞Bayesian persuasion
Information design
Private persuasion
Strategic voting

上次更新時間 2021-17-01 於 02:01