State Ownership and Regulatory Costs: A Law and Economic Explanation for the Prevalence of State-Owned Enterprises in China
Publication in policy or professional journal

香港中文大學研究人員

其它資訊
摘要Despite China's effort to privatize many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) after 1978, SOEs remain a prevalent type of enterprise in contemporary China. There is a widespread belief that they are inefficient and only exist because they have captured the government. This belief however does not fully explain why SOEs have been privatized in some sectors but not in others. This Article provides an efficiency explanation of SOEs in China. Applying the law and economic theory on the ownership of enterprise to state ownership, this Article conceptualizes the efficiency of SOEs as a tradeoff between two social costs: ownership costs and regulatory costs. SOEs generally have high ownership costs and thus are not common in many developed countries. However, in developing countries with weak regulatory capacity and legal institutions, they may help reduce regulatory costs, including the social costs associated with the enactment, alteration, and enforcement of regulatory rules, and those costs resulting from the failure to regulate enterprises adequately. The magnitude of regulatory costs in a specific country and industry, in turn, is significantly
influenced by the regulatory institutions within which the enterprises operate. An important implication is that refining regulatory regimes may reduce regulatory costs and - in part by facilitating privatization of SOEs - enhance social efficiency.
出版社接受日期20.09.2017
著者James Si Zeng
期刊名稱Columbia Journal of Asian Law
出版年份2017
月份9
卷號31
期次1
頁次1 - 71
國際標準期刊號1094-8449
電子國際標準期刊號2373-0498
語言美式英語

上次更新時間 2020-06-05 於 14:21