The State as Both Regulator and Player: The Politics of Transfer of Development Rights in China
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AbstractThe conventional argument that the introduction of transfer of development rights (TDR) shifts the power of land use regulation from the state to the market is increasingly under challenge. In China, the state’s grip on land is rather reinforced through TDR, of which the state is both the regulator and the player. This state-dominated form of TDR implicates China in three ways. First, competing aspirations of different scales of government complicate how TDR is implemented. Although the central state promotes TDR to maintain a national balance of arable land, some local states rather instrumentalize it to expand their landed basis of accumulation. Second, TDR tends to benefit the state but not its people. It may increase the fiscal income of the sending government and lessen the land shortage of the receiving government, but sometimes at the expense of the interests of land users without land ownership. Third, given the state’s deep involvement, the key for China’s TDR to protect arable land lies not so much in clear property rights or a full-fledged market as in the effective checks and balances of state powers over TDR. These implications enunciate the embeddedness of the nature of TDR in the local political economy.
Acceptance Date22/05/2019
All Author(s) ListShao Z., Xu J., Chung C. K. L., Spit T., Wu Q.
Journal nameInternational Journal of Urban and Regional Research
Year2020
Month1
Volume Number44
Issue Number1
PublisherWiley
Place of PublicationUK
Pages38 - 54
ISSN0309-1317
eISSN1468-2427
LanguagesEnglish-United Kingdom
KeywordsChina, local government, transfer of development rights, arable land preservation, land use management, state-market relationship

Last updated on 2020-05-08 at 04:17