The Paradox of Representation in Nishitani’s Critique of Kant
Chapter in an edited book (author)

Other information
AbstractKant’s Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates that it is impossible to have knowledge of the Thing in Itself by means of either concepts or intuitions. Nishitani does not seem to dispute Kant’s claim that the Thing in Itself cannot be known by means of reason or indeed by an act of consciousness whatever. But the Critique of Pure Reason does not demonstrate that it is impossible to know the Thing in Itself through purely non-subjective, non-representational, and non-conceptual means. In what follows, I reconstruct Nishitani’s formulation of the paradox of representation and show how his method of resolving the paradox illuminates the non-conceptual means by which the Thing in Itself may be known. For Nishitani, rather than attempt to know the Thing in Itself by means of reason or subjectivity in general, the Thing in Itself can still be known by transcending Reason and subjectivity altogether. To state this even more generally, insofar as philosophy itself performs its rational work from the standpoint of subjectivity (whether implicitly or explicitly), the Thing in Itself can only be known by transcending the standpoint of philosophy. In Nishitani’s terms, the only way to know the Thing in Itself is by “breaking through self-consciousness
Acceptance Date31/01/2018
All Author(s) ListGregory Scott Moss
All Editor(s) ListStephen R. Palmquist
Book titleKant on Intuition: Western and Asian Perspectives on Transcendental Idealism
Series TitleRoutledge Studies in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy
LanguagesEnglish-United States

Last updated on 2018-29-10 at 09:49