Pathology of Hybrid Regulatory Regime: The Political Economy of China’s Stock Market Crisis 2014-2015
Refereed conference paper presented and published in conference proceedings

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AbstractThe institutional hybridization of modern stock market arrangements with China’s own Leninist system of governance has generated unusual features in the policy regime of China’s stock market development. Between 2014 and 2015, China experienced a major round of stock market boom and crash, with profound implications on China’s financial stability and regulatory reforms. This paper examines how the institutional hybridization of Western modern stock market arrangements with Chinese Communist Party’s traditional mechanisms of governance and control has shaped the regulatory incentives, policy initiatives and responses during China’s stock market crisis in 2014-2015. It shows that China’s hybrid regulatory regime is enmeshed in tensions among conflicting institutional logics and policy directions, which lead to policy volatility and policy-induced market volatility. It identifies and analyzes three pathological features in China’s hybrid regulatory regime: 1) multi-tasking principle-agency dilemma; 2) self-limiting campaign-style enforcement; 3) regulatory arbitrage and corruption.
Acceptance Date02/06/2018
All Author(s) ListLI Chen
Name of ConferenceThe 2018 Harvard Law School's Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) Conference: "Law in Global Political Economy: Heterodox Now"
Start Date of Conference02/06/2018
End Date of Conference03/06/2018
Place of ConferenceBoston
Country/Region of ConferenceUnited States of America
LanguagesEnglish-United States

Last updated on 2018-06-12 at 14:12