An Internationalised solution to Nigeria’s resource Paradox
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AbstractThe resource curse theory (also known as the paradox of plenty) postulates that countries with abundant natural resources often experience hindered economic development compared to their less endowed counterparts because of the mismanagement of their extractive industry.

Natural resources generate rents (excess profits), which leads to rapacious rent-seeking. This describes a situation where a small group of people who have political control manipulate the social, economic and regulatory structures of the state in order to capture these rents and possibly hold on to political control continuously. Its effects often favour a pattern of increased corruption/kleptocracy; judicial indecorousness; distorted democracy/electoral malfeasance; weak institutions; distorted allocation of resources revenue; deplorable human development/pervasive poverty; civil conflicts/petro-insurgency and large scale environmental degradation.

Greater transparency has been widely flaunted as a means to quell this anomaly (paradox). Figures relating to how much oil companies pay in royalties, taxes and other revenues to governments are usually hidden away from the public. It is suggested that if this information were disclosed to citizens, they would be better equipped to hold government accountable for expenditure. This inspired various initiatives targeting opacity like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and its mandatory domestic equivalent the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI).

Regrettably, its impact has been minimal because the NEITI Act did not include powers to prosecute. As a result, NEITI relies on domestic law enforcement agents, particularly the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to further investigate and prosecute based on its findings. So far, considerably few cases have been investigated based on these reports and even when charges are filed, the process is stifled due to systemic judicial corruption, lack of independence and political interference. Ultimately, there is no political will to progress beyond transparency.

In addressing these issues, this research seeks to extract accountability through judicial reform by incorporating criminal repression mechanisms as part of Nigeria's petro-governance structure. An analysis of successful (and semi-successful) international intervention over cases where domestic courts have been unwilling/unable to prosecute certain cadre of criminal activity by high ranking military or political leaders forms the basis of this recommendation.
All Author(s) ListEbele Angela ONYEABO
Name of ConferenceCUHK – Kyoto Joint Research Postgraduate Workshop 2018
Start Date of Conference22/03/2018
End Date of Conference23/03/2018
Place of ConferenceChinese University of Hong Kong
Country/Region of ConferenceHong Kong
Year2018
LanguagesEnglish-United Kingdom

Last updated on 2018-19-10 at 17:32