State Response to Resource Conflicts: Evidence from China
Refereed conference paper presented and published in conference proceedings



摘要How do authoritarian regimes respond to social conflicts that may threaten their stability? Existing studies suggest that authoritarian states can deploy repressive apparatus to suffocate conflicts; alternatively, they can use redistributive policies to appease aggrieved citizens and resolve conflicts. This research focuses on the Chinese Communist party-state’s responses to a particular type of social conflicts, namely resource conflicts aroused by the extraction of mineral resources. Through mixed methods combining in-depth field research and panel data analysis on Chinese localities, it finds that local governments in resource-rich regions do not heavily spend on coercive apparatus to suppress social unrests. By contrast, they generously spend on social safety networks for local citizens, which can partially compensate the heavy costs imposed by the negative externalities of the mining industries. Furthermore, the state response conditions on the scale of the mining industries: The concentration of extractive activities in large mining companies helps decrease both the need for resource conflict resolution and the fiscal burden on the state to deploy relief policies. The findings suggest that authoritarian regimes do not always use repression to stifle social conflicts. Instead, they may redistribute resources among different social groups and use relief policies to defuse social unrests and maintain regime stability.
著者Jing Vivian Zhan
會議名稱ISA-FLACSO Joint International Conference 2018
關鍵詞China, conflict resolution, redistribution, repression, resource curse

上次更新時間 2018-30-11 於 12:07