The Schizophrenic Board Secretary-Flip-flopper Intermediary Agent between Multiple Principals
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AbstractTo date, the traditional concept of principal-agent theorization has been extended into principal-principal and multiple agents issues. Yet, the business is far more complex and complicated than we’ve conceptualized, especially in those emerging economies that have experienced many of governmental interventions. One typical question is then that are those governance control methods derived from agency theory effective in those emerging contexts. This study pioneers an intermediary agent issue that primarily represented by the mandated board secretaries who need to satisfy interests from two sides in those listed firms in the emerging economies, which is further modestly enlarging the boundaries of agency theory. We explored the effectiveness of government imposition of recruitment of board secretary in 3346 listed firms on Chinese National Equities and Exchange and Quotations system between 2014 to 2017. Specifically, we’ve found that government mandating to have the board secretary won’t help to reduce misconducts as the governments expected due to an intermediary agent problem in which they have to satisfy two conflicting alignments of interests. However, once haven the position, given higher shares to the board secretaries and stricter institutional regulations would alleviate the problems.
Acceptance Date29/03/2018
All Author(s) ListLIU Bin
Name of Conference2018 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management
Start Date of Conference10/08/2018
End Date of Conference14/08/2018
Place of ConferenceChicago, U.S.A.
Country/Region of ConferenceUnited States of America
LanguagesEnglish-United States
KeywordsAgency Theory, Intermediary Agent, Board Secretary, Misconducts, Emerging Economies

Last updated on 2018-16-10 at 15:23