Bureaucrats as Managers and their roles in Corporate Diversification
Publication in refereed journal

香港中文大學研究人員
替代計量分析
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其它資訊
摘要We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals.
出版社接受日期01.03.2017
著者Joseph P.H. Fan, Jun Huang, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Mengxin Zhao
期刊名稱Journal of Corporate Finance
出版年份2020
月份8
卷號63
出版社Elsevier
文章號碼101171
國際標準期刊號0929-1199
電子國際標準期刊號1872-6313
語言美式英語
關鍵詞Bureaucrat managers, Corporate diversification, Institutions

上次更新時間 2021-20-01 於 01:56