The Lundbeck Case and the Concept of Potential Competition
Publication in refereed journal

Other information
AbstractAntitrust rules have been brought into play in situations whereby a company tries to prevent, or at least delay, the entry into the market of potential competitors. This issue has gained prominence in the context of patents and intellectual property (IP) rights in the pharmaceutical industry. Patent holders of a drug sometimes enter into a ‘reverse payment agreement’ with generics manufacturers, in order to settle prospective patent litigation. The sum agreed might also cover delaying the entry of the generic version of the drug into the market (‘pay-for-delay’ settlement), which could be harmful for competition. And yet the fact remains that, when reverse payment agreements are entered into, the generics manufacturers are not actual competitors of the patent holder. To what extent should the application of competition extend to a future threat which may never materialise? This paper brings together a panel of experts in order to analyse these issues, recently highlighted by the General Court’s judgment in the Lundbeck case.
Acceptance Date02/01/2017
All Author(s) ListSandra Marco Colino, Knut Fournier, Sofia Païs, Derek Ritzmann, Niamh Dunne
Journal nameConcurrences Review
Volume Number2017
Issue Number2
Place of PublicationParis and New York
Pages24 - 50
LanguagesEnglish-United Kingdom
Keywordscompetition law, antitrust, pharmaceuticals, pay-for-delay agreements, reverse payment agreements, price fixing, patent litigation, intellectual property rights, Lundbeck

Last updated on 2018-19-01 at 10:52