Extension of Game Riskiness Model in Prisoner's Dilemmas through Expected Utility Perspective
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香港中文大學研究人員

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摘要Game riskiness model is a way to conceptualize risk in prisoner’s dilemmas (PDs) such that the riskiness of cooperation is defined by the variance of outcomes of cooperation relative to the variance of outcomes of defection. PDs with variance of cooperation outcomes greater (less) than that of defection outcomes are termed as more risky games (less risky games). Past studies found that risk-seeking individuals cooperated more in more risky games while risk-averse individuals cooperated more in less risky games, and the positive effect of expectation of cooperation (EC) on cooperation was larger among more risky games than among less risky games (Au et al., 2012; Ng & Au, 2016). The present paper extends the game riskiness model through expected utility perspective and hypothesized that the positive effect of EC on cooperation would be larger among risk-averse individuals than among risk-seeking individuals. The hypotheses were tested using a field study such that university students who were taking psychology courses that had group projects were invited to participate in the study. They were asked their estimated course score in four hypothetical situations in which the four hypothetical situations correspond to the four possible outcomes in PDs. In this way, we were able to capture their perceived conflict template of the group project. They were also asked their expectation of contribution of themselves and other group members. Their risk attitude was measured by a set of ten risk gambles. Consistent with our hypotheses, for those who perceived the group projects as PDs, the positive effect of EC of other group members on their contribution was larger among more risky games than among less risky games. We also found that the positive effect of EC on their contribution was larger among risk-averse individuals than among risk-seeking individuals. The present study demonstrated that the game riskiness model can be generalized beyond laboratory settings to real-life settings and beyond monetary payoffs to other domains.
著者NG Gary Ting Tat, AU Wing Tung
會議名稱17th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
會議開始日20.06.2017
會議完結日23.06.2017
會議地點Taormina, Sicily
會議國家/地區意大利
出版年份2017
語言美式英語

上次更新時間 2018-12-12 於 16:20