Fairness in Secure Computing Protocols Based on Incentives
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AbstractCloud computing is based on utility and consumption of computer resources. To solve the security issues in cloud computing, secure computing protocols are often used. Recently, rational parties as a new kind of parties are proposed, who wish to maximize their utilities in secure computing protocols. The utility definitions in most previous rational secure computing protocols derive from prisoner’s dilemma game (PD game). In two-party rational computing protocols, parties decide to send their shares according to their utilities. Recently, we revisit the incentives for rational parties in secure computing protocols and give new utility definitions according to them. We find that the new utility definition is not similar to PD game any more. We discuss two-party and multi-party cases, respectively, and prove that parties have incentives to send their share to others. Furthermore, we also prove that parties can maximize their utilities in both cases.
Acceptance Date14/12/2015
All Author(s) ListYilei Wang, Leisi Chen, Ho-fung Leung, Chengyu Hu, Beijing Chen
Journal nameSoft Computing
Year2016
Month10
Volume Number20
Issue Number10
PublisherSpringer
Place of PublicationHeidelberg
Pages3947 - 3955
ISSN1432-7643
eISSN1433-7479
LanguagesEnglish-United States
KeywordsFairness, Rational computing, Modularization, Nash equilibrium

Last updated on 2020-02-08 at 02:13