Internalism, emotionism, and the psychopathy challenge
Publication in refereed journal


Times Cited
Altmetrics Information
.

Other information
AbstractThe phenomenon of psychopathy has been regarded as a putative challenge to motivational internalism, which asserts a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation. An increasingly popular internalist response to the psychopathy challenge is to argue that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments because they lack moral emotions (e.g., sympathy and guilt), which are alleged to be causally constitutive of moral judgments. In this paper, I attempt to reject the emotion-based internalist response by appeal to most recent empirical research on psychopathy, moral cognition, and moral dilemmas. I argue that emotion is not causally responsible for even normal people's moral judgment (although emotion may titrate the severity of moral judgment). © 2014 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.
All Author(s) ListZhong L.
Journal namePhilosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology
Year2013
Month1
Day1
Volume Number20
Issue Number4
PublisherJohns Hopkins University Press
Place of PublicationUnited States
Pages329 - 337
ISSN1071-6076
LanguagesEnglish-United Kingdom
KeywordsEmotionism, Internalism, Moral dilemmas, Psychopathy

Last updated on 2024-27-08 at 00:12