On Trojan side channel design and identification
Refereed conference paper presented and published in conference proceedings

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AbstractTrojan side channels (TSCs) are serious threats to the security of cryptographic systems because they facilitate to leak secret keys to attackers via covert side channels that are unknown to designers. To tackle this problem, we present a new hardware Trojan detection technique for TSCs. To be specific, we first investigate general power-based TSC designs and discuss the tradeoff between their hardware cost and the complexity of the key cracking process. Next, we present our TSC identification technique based on the correlation between the key and the covert physical side channels used by attackers. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
All Author(s) ListZhang J., Su G., Liu Y., Wei L., Yuan F., Bai G., Xu Q.
Name of Conference2014 33rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2014
Start Date of Conference02/11/2014
End Date of Conference06/11/2014
Place of ConferenceSan Jose
Country/Region of ConferenceUnited States of America
Detailed descriptionorganized by IEEE/ACM,
Volume Number2015-January
Issue NumberJanuary
Pages278 - 285
LanguagesEnglish-United Kingdom

Last updated on 2020-04-08 at 03:00