Security adoption in heterogeneous networks: The influence of cyber-insurance market
Refereed conference paper presented and published in conference proceedings

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摘要Hosts (or nodes) in the Internet often face epidemic risks such as virus and worms attack. Despite the awareness of these risks and the availability of anti-virus software, investment in security protection is still scare, and hence epidemic risk is still prevalent. Deciding whether to invest in security protection is an interdependent process: security investment decision made by one node can affect the security risk of others, and therefore affect their decisions also. The first contribution of this paper is to provide a fundamental understanding on how "network externality" effect with "nodes heterogeneity" may affect security adoption. We characterize it as a Bayesian network game in which nodes only have the local information, e.g., the number of neighbors, as well as minimum common information, e.g., degree distribution of the network. Our second contribution is in analyzing a new form of risk management called cyber-insurance. We investigate how the presence of competitive insurance market can affect the security adoption. © 2012 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
著者Yang Z., Lui J.C.S.
會議名稱11th International IFIP TC 6 Networking Conference, NETWORKING 2012
會議開始日21.05.2012
會議完結日25.05.2012
會議地點Prague
會議國家/地區捷克共和國
詳細描述organized by IFIP,
出版年份2012
月份6
日期5
卷號7290 LNCS
期次PART 2
出版社Springer Verlag
出版地Germany
頁次172 - 183
國際標準書號9783642300530
國際標準期刊號0302-9743
語言英式英語
關鍵詞Bayesian network game, cyber-insurance, heterogeneous network, security adoption

上次更新時間 2020-14-10 於 01:52