Physicalism without Supervenience
Publication in refereed journal
Full Text
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) DOI for CUHK Users |
Times Cited
Altmetrics Information
.
Other information
AbstractIt is widely accepted that supervenience is a minimal commitment of physicalism. In this article, however, I aim to argue that physicalism should be exempted from the supervenience requirement. My arguments rely on a parallel between ontological dependence and causal dependence. Since causal dependence does not require causal determination, ontological dependence should not require ontological determination either. Moreover, my approach has a significant theoretical advantage: if physicalism is not committed to supervenience, then the metaphysical possibility of zombies—which is still wide open after all these years—would pose no challenge to physicalism.
All Author(s) ListLei Zhong
Journal namePhilosophical Studies
Year2021
Volume Number178
Issue Number5
Pages1529 - 1544
ISSN0031-8116
LanguagesEnglish-United States