An Energy Sharing Mechanism Considering Network Constraints and Market Power Limitation
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AbstractAs the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy sharing mechanism to address the above challenges. It takes into account network constraints and fairness among prosumers. In the proposed energy sharing market, all prosumers play a generalized Nash game. The market equilibrium is proved to have nice features in a large market or when it is a variational equilibrium. To deal with the possible market failure, inefficiency, or instability in general cases, we introduce a price regulation policy to avoid market power exploitation. The improved energy sharing mechanism with price regulation can guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a socially near-optimal market equilibrium. Some advantageous properties are proved, such as the prosumer’s individual rationality, a sharing price structure similar to the locational marginal price, and the tendency towards social optimum with an increasing number of prosumers. For implementation, a practical bidding algorithm is developed with a convergence condition. Experimental results validate the theoretical outcomes and show the practicability of our model and method.
Acceptance Date16/08/2022
All Author(s) ListYue Chen, Changhong Zhao, Steven H. Low, Adam Wierman
Journal nameIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Year2023
Month3
Volume Number14
Issue Number2
PublisherIEEE
Pages1027 - 1041
ISSN1949-3053
eISSN1949-3061
LanguagesEnglish-United States
