BARGAINING AND SEARCH WITH RECALL - A 2-PERIOD MODEL WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
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摘要Two standard results of previous bargaining models state that delay is generally not expected to occur under complete information, and bargaining outcome depends crucially on the bargainers' intrinsic characteristics that determine their reservation prices, and, in general, bargainers with ''better'' reservation prices tend to get better outcomes. This paper considers a bilateral bargaining problem with complete information in which one of the bargainers, the buyer, is allowed to search while bargaining. More importantly, we assume that the buyer is allowed to recall past outside offers. We find that, quite contrary to the standard results of previous complete information bargaining models, complete information renders no guarantee for immediate resolution of bargaining, and the effect of changing the buyer's search cost on each player's bargaining outcome is unpredictable. The major driving force of these two results is the assumption that the buyer can recall past outside offers.
著者LEE CC
期刊名稱Operations Research
出版年份1994
月份11
日期1
卷號42
期次6
出版社OPERATIONS RES SOC AMER
頁次1100 - 1109
國際標準期刊號0030-364X
電子國際標準期刊號1526-5463
語言英式英語
Web of Science 學科類別Business & Economics; Management; MANAGEMENT; Operations Research & Management Science; OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

上次更新時間 2020-31-05 於 02:54