Strategic information sharing in a supply chain
Publication in refereed journal


摘要We consider a two-member supply chain that manufactures and sells newsboy-type products and comprises a downstream retailer and an upstream vendor. In this supply chain, the vendor is responsible for making stock-level decisions and holding the inventory, and the retailer is better informed about market demand. In each period, the retailer receives a signal about market demand before the actual demand is realized, and must decide whether to reveal the information to the vendor, at a cost, before the vendor starts production. We assume that any information that the retailer reveals is truthful. We model the situation as a Bayesian game, and find that, in equilibrium, whether the retailer reveals or withholds the information depends on two things-the cost of revealing the information and the nature of market demand signal that the retailer receives. If the cost of sharing the information is sufficiently large, then the retailer will withhold the information from the vendor regardless of the type of signal that is received. If the cost of sharing the information is small, then the retailer will reveal the information to the vendor if a high demand is signaled, but will withhold it from the vendor if a low demand is signaled. In general, reducing the cost of sharing information and increasing the profit margin of either the retailer or the vendor (or reducing the cost of the vendor or retailer) will facilitate information sharing. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
著者Chu WHJ, Lee CC
期刊名稱European Journal of Operational Research
頁次1567 - 1579
關鍵詞asymmetric information; game theory; information sharing; supply chain
Web of Science 學科類別Business & Economics; Management; Operations Research & Management Science; OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

上次更新時間 2020-12-07 於 03:25