Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: a Nash-bargaining analysis
Publication in refereed journal

香港中文大學研究人員

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摘要This paper explores the implications of inter-generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household. Adopting a Nash-bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points, it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption. Such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
著者Suen W, Chan W, Zhang JS
期刊名稱Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
出版年份2003
月份9
日期1
卷號52
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
頁次133 - 146
國際標準期刊號0167-2681
電子國際標準期刊號1879-1751
語言英式英語
關鍵詞dowry; inter-generational transfers; intra-household allocation
Web of Science 學科類別Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS

上次更新時間 2020-28-10 於 00:05