Does regulatory reform of cumulative voting promote a more balanced power distribution in the boardroom?
Publication in refereed journal

香港中文大學研究人員
替代計量分析
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其它資訊
摘要In the presence of dominant shareholders, it remains uncertain whether the introduction of cumulative voting (CV) in board elections can elevate board representation of non-controlling substantial shareholders and curb the expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant shareholders. With hand-collected director-level data, we conduct DID-style analysis of China's CV reform. We find that non-controlling substantial shareholders cooperated in voting to raise their board representation, and CV implementation curbed tunneling activities and enhanced firm value. The results are especially strong in a subsample of firms whose second largest shareholder has a sufficiently large ownership proportion to elect her/his favored candidates onto boards.
著者Yinghui Chen, Julan Du
期刊名稱Journal of Corporate Finance
出版年份2020
月份10
卷號64
出版社Elsevier
文章號碼101655
國際標準期刊號0929-1199
電子國際標準期刊號1872-6313
語言美式英語

上次更新時間 2021-28-11 於 00:11