Three Versions of Physical Closure
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AbstractThe Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be-adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, and a wide notion of the physical, respectively. The author then argues that none of the three versions can challenge non-reductive physicalism.
All Author(s) ListLei Zhong
Journal nameGrazer Philosophische Studien
Year2020
Month11
Volume Number97
Issue Number4
PublisherBrill
Pages640 - 658
ISSN0165-9227
eISSN1875-6735
LanguagesEnglish-United States

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