Does Restricting Outsiders Always Lower Price and Benefit Insiders?
Publication in refereed journal
Officially Accepted for Publication

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AbstractPolicies that restrict outsiders are common. Some justifications include protecting insiders from high price and leaving more of the concerned products to insiders. Sometimes these policies fail to work because outsiders can get around the restrictions. In a model in which a policy of restricting outsiders is anticipated, we find that if the policy works, it only sometimes lowers the price. When the price does decrease, the product quality decreases too. Not every insider would benefit equally; those insiders who likely suffer are identified. While restricting outsiders may or may not reduce insiders’ consumer surplus, outsiders and the producer are always worse off. They therefore would find ways to get around the restrictions. Evaluating these policies must (a) take into account the possibility that they might not work at all, (b) check their effects beyond just price if they do work.
Acceptance Date23/09/2020
All Author(s) ListTat-Kei Lai, Travis Ng
Journal nameJournal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
LanguagesEnglish-United States
KeywordsProduct quality, Customer restrictions, Vertical restraints, Foreign restrictions, Discrimination

Last updated on 2021-20-10 at 23:56