Political Connections in the Land Market: Evidence from China's State-owned Enterprises
Publication in refereed journal
已正式接受出版

香港中文大學研究人員

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摘要This study examines whether political connections lead state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately-owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9\% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state-owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state-level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti-corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.
出版社接受日期18.06.2020
著者Long WANG, Yang YANG
期刊名稱Real Estate Economics
出版年份2020
出版社Wiley
國際標準期刊號1080-8620
語言美式英語
關鍵詞Land Market, Political Connections, Information Advantage, Stock Market Response, Anti-corruption

上次更新時間 2021-11-01 於 23:29